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THE DANGERS OF FIGHTING TERRORISM WITH 
TECHNOCOMMUNITARIANISM: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF FREE 
EXPRESSION, EXPLORATION, AND 
UNMONITORED ACTIVITY IN URBAN SPACES 
Marc Jonathan Blitz*
The narrower the circle to which we commit ourselves, the less freedom 
of individuality we possess . . . . In a narrow circle, one can preserve 
one’s individuality, as a rule, in only two ways.  Either one leads the 
circle (it is for this reason that strong personalities like to be “number one 
in the village”), or one exists in it only externally, being independent of it 
in all essential matters. 
 
— Georg Simmel, Group Expansion and the Development of 
Individuality1
INTRODUCTION 
 
The cult television series “The Prisoner” tells the story of a man who, 
after losing and then regaining consciousness, opens the blinds of his 
London flat to find that the world outside has undergone a Kafkaesque 
transformation: the skyscrapers and city streets visible from his window 
have been replaced with a small and serene village.2
 
* Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law.  The discussion in this 
paper grew out of, and benefited immensely from workshops and individual discussions 
with many law school faculty members and attorneys.  Many of the proposals in this article 
originated in discussions with Chad Oldfather and Eduardo M. Peñalver regarding the 
respects in which emerging video surveillance systems resemble the natural surveillance 
that already exists in many small communities.  It also benefited from provocative questions 
and/or thoughts regarding privacy and video (or other forms of) surveillance from David 
Medine, Becky Burr, Will DeVries, Joseph Onek, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Deirdre 
Mulligan, David Yang, Tara Wheatland, Jeffrey Rosen, John Shore, Christopher Slobogin, 
and John Eden.  I also owe many thanks to Michael Dallal, Marni Brot, Amy Lambert, 
Jessica Berenbroick and the other editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal who organized 
this Symposium and provided substantial assistance with this article. 
  Accompanying this 
 1. Georg Simmel, Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality, in ON 
INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 251, 255 (Donald Levine ed., 1971). 
 2. See ALAIN CARRAZE & HELENE OSWALD, THE PRISONER 35 (1990) (providing a 
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stark change in his external environment is a sharp decrease in his freedom.  
Whereas his life in London was his own, he discovers upon venturing out 
into the village3 that his decisions and actions are now community 
property.  He is watched everywhere he goes both by neighbors and hidden 
cameras.4  He is expected to be an enthusiastic participant in all communal 
events, and is ostracized as “unmutual” when he instead seeks out privacy 
and seclusion.5  The town’s authorities are intent on ensuring that residents 
cannot opt out of village life: quaint taxis transport people within the 
village, but never outside of it; phone service is strictly local; maps at the 
village store show nothing beyond the community’s boundaries.6  Each 
showing of independence or defiance by the protagonist brings strong 
pressure from the authorities to fully account for (and recant) his actions.7  
In short, his familiar urban life is replaced with a communitarian dystopia, 
hostile to privacy and deeply suspicious of every act of individuality.8
The story of environmental shock depicted in this television series has 
also made an appearance in sociological observation.  Decades ago, one of 
the founders of sociology, Georg Simmel, imagined what it would be like 
for an inhabitant of a modern metropolis to be suddenly lifted out of his 
urban existence and dropped into the smaller and more confining world of 
an ancient or medieval village.  The modern city dweller, said Simmel, 
“could not even breathe under such conditions.”
 
9  He could not tolerate the 
“limits upon [his] movements” or the restrictions on “his relationships with 
the outside world.”10  Nor could he suffer the loss of the “inner 
independence and differentiation” that would accompany such a shift from 
the city to a close knit, loyalty-demanding community.11
 
summary and episode guide to the television series). 
  While such an 
environment may have seemed tolerable to individuals born and bred 
within its confines, it would be insufferable, said Simmel, to anyone who 
long enjoyed the individual freedom made possible by the anonymity and 
 3. The community is called only “the Village” by its inhabitants and rulers. 
 4. CARRAZE & OSWALD, supra note 2 at 38, 153-57. 
 5. Id. at 153-57. 
 6. Id. at 35-36. 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 46-47, 153-57. 
 8. Somewhat ironically, the main character does succeed in completely retaining 
anonymity with respect to at least one outside party: television viewers never learn his real 
name, as he is referred to in the Village only as “Number 6.”  See generally CARRAZE & 
OSWALD, supra note 2. 
 9. Georg Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, in ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL 
FORMS 324, 333 (Donald Levine ed., 1971) [hereinafter Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental 
Life].  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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incomparable diversity of modern city life.  This modern urban 
environment, he stressed, provides individuals with a “type and degree of 
personal freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances.”12  
In the limited space of a small village, one can express individuality only 
when acting as a leader, as the “number one” figure “in the village,” or 
when “exist[ing] in it only externally [as an outcast].”13  By contrast, in city 
life, the multitude of options and the indifference of neighbors provide 
people with plenty of room to follow their own unique paths while still 
being part and parcel of the larger urban community.  As E.B White has 
written in his celebration of New York,  city life can thus blend “the gift of 
privacy with the excitement of participation.”14
But if the unparalleled individual freedom one gains in urban anonymity 
is deeply valued, is it also constitutionally protected?  If municipal or state 
governments decide, for example, that the extensive freedom and 
anonymity provided by modern city life not only provides valuable room 
for individuality, but also worrisome hiding space for terrorists or 
criminals, can they take measures to “roll back” some of this unmonitored 
space?  Can they make it more difficult for individuals to escape 
government monitoring or avoid identification in public places?  Or would 
such a transformation cross important First Amendment or other 
constitutional boundary lines? 
 
These questions are important ones as cities, police departments, and 
other government actors struggle with the difficult challenges associated 
with protecting urban areas against terrorism in the wake of the September 
11 attacks and those in Madrid and London.  The dangers of terrorism 
predictably cause such actors (and the citizens they represent) to take more 
interest in others’ (possibly dangerous) actions.  New chemical and 
biological weapons allow hateful individuals and small organizations to 
 
 12. Id. at 332. 
 13. Georg Simmel, Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality, supra note 
1, at 261 (Donald Levine ed., 1971). 
 14. See E.B. WHITE, HERE IS NEW YORK 22 (Little Bookroom 1999) (1949), available at 
http://mbhs.bergtraum.k12.ny.us/cybereng/shorts/white.html (last visited September 5, 
2005).  I am indebted to Kenneth Jackson for informing me, and other audience members, of 
this E.B. White quote in his introductory remarks at the Symposium which gave rise to this 
article. See also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237-38 
(1990) (defining “city life” as “the being together of strangers” and emphasizing that while 
city dwellers are “bound together” they can follow diverse ends, rather committing 
themselves to “shared final ends”); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1047, 1049 (1996) (claiming that city life establishes common bonds between 
residents not by “cultivating a feeling of oneness,” but rather by “fostering a recognition that 
one has to share one’s life with strangers, with strangeness, with the inassimilable, even the 
intolerable”). 
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cause fatalities and economic destruction of a magnitude that could 
previously have been inflicted only by a large and highly visible army.  Not 
surprisingly, law enforcement and other officials have taken a keen interest 
in powerful surveillance and identification technologies that might allow 
them to more effectively locate and thwart these very dangerous and 
difficult to detect threats.  Not surprisingly, while such technologies may 
well undermine the freedoms we are used to finding in cities, many 
officials and citizens alike now wonder whether this is a sacrifice worth 
making—and whether the unparalleled anonymity and freedom that we are 
now accustomed to in cities is a luxury that we can no longer afford in the 
current security context.  As Simmel himself recognized when describing 
the individual freedom one finds in the metropolis, such freedom is 
unlikely to flourish in a society that feels itself under “an incessant threat 
against its existence by enemies near and far.”15
As a result, the nature of city life appears to be changing.  On the streets 
of London, which “The Prisoner” presented over three decades ago as a 
striking contrast to the claustrophobic and camera-monitored confines of 
the main character’s new and involuntarily-imposed community, 
individuals are now watched constantly by cameras as they walk from 
block to block or drive down the road.  As Jeffrey Rosen observed, there 
are 4.2 million cameras in Britain, many in London proper, including 
“speed cameras and red-light cameras, cameras in lobbies and elevators, in 
hotels and restaurants, in nursery schools and high schools.”
 
16  In part, 
these cameras are intended to protect citizens against terrorism: they were 
used to gather invaluable data about the July 2005 terrorist strikes against 
the London public transport system.17  But they have also been used to 
gather significant information from street life and shopping malls that is 
unrelated to terror attacks or serious crimes.18
 
 15. Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, supra note 
  Far from worrying that such 
routine monitoring of citizens will undercut individualism, the British 
government has taken the stance that citizens should have no anxieties 
about submitting themselves to external observation since, in the words of 
a pro-camera campaign slogan, “[i]f you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got 
9, at 333. 
 16. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN 
ANXIOUS AGE 36-37 (2004). 
 17. See Will Knight, CCTV Footage Shows London Suicide Bombers, NEW 
SCIENTIST.COM (July 13, 2005), at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7669 (last 
visited July 16, 2005)  (reporting that “[s]urveillance cameras provided a vital breakthrough 
in the hunt responsible for the four bomb blasts that killed at least 52 people in London, UK 
on 7 July”).  
 18. See ROSEN, supra note 16, at 48-54 (describing use of video surveillance cameras 
for banning certain individuals from malls and observation of non-criminal activity). 
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nothing to fear.”19
Just as significant as the spread of cameras is the fast embrace of new 
technologies that can instantaneously identify strangers as they walk 
through public spaces.  Americans today have some experience with these 
technologies; they realize that they leave a trail of information about their 
whereabouts and activities whenever they use credit cards, make calls on 
cell phones, or drive their cars through electronic tollway systems.  The 
future also promises to bring newer, more powerful identification 
technologies which are even more difficult to escape.  The last decade, for 
example, witnessed tremendous growth in the use of “biometric” 
technologies which identify people by their distinctive physiological 
features.  Citizens might be identified with iris or retinal scanners, or with 
devices that allow entry into parks or plazas only in return for an 
identifiable hand scan or fingerprint.  Cameras might also be equipped with 
“face recognition software” that matches a person walking on a street to a 
“face print” in a database.
 
20
Such technologies are already in use, on an experimental basis, in 
airports and at sporting events.  The war on terrorism has bolstered interest 
in their use.  The Defense Department, for example, conducted a “Human 
Identification at a Distance program” to “develop automated biometric 
identification technologies to detect, recognize and identify humans at great 
distances” providing “critical early warning support for force protection 
and homeland defense against terrorist, criminal, and other human-based 
threats.”
 
21  The Defense Department has also encouraged development of 
so-called “3-D Combat Zone” technology that will not only be able to 
identify “vehicles by size, color, shape, and license tag” but also identify 
the faces of drivers and passengers.22
While many observers have expressed deep concern about this 
transformation of urban space, others have argued that, implemented 
correctly, such a technological transformation might make city life more 
communitarian, that is, city life would be more like a small town where 
 
 
 19. Id. at 36. 
 20. See generally SAMIR NANAVATI ET AL., BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY VERIFICATION IN A 
NETWORKED WORLD (2002); JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY 
ASSURANCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2003).  
 21. See David Goldberg, Human ID at a Distance, 21C MAGAZINE, at 
http://www.21cmagazine.com /issue2/iao_remix/humanid.html (last visited May 15, 2005). 
 22. See Michael J. Sniffen, Pentagon Wants City-Wide Vision, AKRON BEACON J., July 
2, 2003, at A6. Although the technology is primarily for combat, the technology itself could 
conceivably be employed to monitor potential threats within America’s borders. See Cynthia 
L. Webb, Newsbytes News Network, Government IT Review, TECHNEWS.COM, July 2, 2003, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
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everyone knows each other and knows a lot about what they do.  This, they 
stress, need not be such a terrifying prospect.  David Brin, for example, 
argues that tremendous good can result when emerging surveillance 
technologies transform each “metropolis” into “an easily spanned village.”  
After such a transformation, he explains, citizens might well feel safer in 
public walking under the protective gaze of powerful cameras while 
simultaneously “us[ing] the godlike power [that comes with these cameras] 
to zoom at will from vantage point to vantage point.”23  Knowing that their 
“[h]omes are sacrosanct,” and that the sacrifice of public anonymity is the 
price they must pay to exploit the wonders of new crime-fighting tools, 
citizens will be able to bear—and benefit from—a world of ubiquitous 
cameras and microphones.24
Others echo Brin’s optimism about the rapid spread of cameras, and 
many have become more receptive to it as Americans’ fear of terrorism has 
grown.  Adam L. Penenberg, for example, writes that “[e]ven as we trade 
privacy for security and convenience, we’re hardly headed toward 
totalitarianism.”
 
25  Citizens, he writes, “have already learned to use 
surveillance tools to keep government accountable” and “transparency . . . 
is almost always a good thing.”26 While privacy in the home remains 
important, “[i]n public institutions and on city streets, the more 
transparency the better.”27  Amitai Etzioni likewise proposes that, in 
determining how to balance the value of privacy with that of the common 
good, Americans often give short shrift to the latter.28  One measure he 
considers to “correct the imbalance” is to employ the use of biometric 
identifiers.29  Indeed, he says, “[t]he minimal opposition to cameras 
installed in many public places suggests that citizens may be less opposed 
to some kinds of biometric ID technologies than to ID cards.”30
Still, such accounts of how cities might become more like small towns 
do not answer the question of whether cities’ current movements in this 
direction raise any constitutional problems.  Are cities free to reconceive 
themselves in this way?  Are they unhindered by First Amendment 
anonymity protections or other constitutional civil liberties when they 
 
 
 23. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE 
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 9 (1998). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Adam L. Penenberg, The Surveillance Society, WIRED, Dec. 2001, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/surveillance.html. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 9-10 (1999). 
 29. Id. at 10, 115-16. 
 30. Id. at 117. 
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install face recognition, iris scanners, or other identification technologies in 
plazas, streets, or train stations?  To ask the same question in a slightly 
different way, is American constitutionalism neutral between the vision of 
urban life presented by Simmel and that offered more recently by Brin?31
I already addressed such questions from one angle in a previous article, 
where I argued that public video surveillance systems should be found in 
some circumstances to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches.
  
Does the Constitution in any sense favor urban landscapes that allow for 
greater freedom and individuality?  Or do defenders of such individualism 
simply have to make peace with the notion that the openness and 
anonymity of twentieth-century cities was just a historical phase rather than 
a constitutional right, and that American Constitutionalism places no 
constraints on cities that prevent them from evolving into closely-
monitored spaces very different from what they once were? 
32  I argued that the Fourth 
Amendment, although currently defined as protecting “reasonable 
expectations of privacy,” should instead be understood to protect certain 
features of environments, both private and public, that provide Americans 
with a certain minimal level of insulation against excessive government 
monitoring.33
This article suggests that there is already a powerful answer to this 
question implicit in modern First Amendment jurisprudence.  Unlike 
modern Fourth Amendment case law, which gives short shrift to the 
importance of insulating public space from government control and 
design,
  That article, however, dealt only in passing with the question 
raised above; namely, what grounds exist for viewing the anonymity and 
freedom that one finds in modern urban life as fundamental features of the 
constitutional landscape?  Why not allow such anonymity and freedom to 
fade as cities evolve in a direction incompatible with them—or be traded 
away for other benefits if elected city, state, or federal representatives 
decide, under voters’ watch, that security concerns demand a new balance 
between privacy, liberty, and other interests? 
34
 
 31. See supra notes 
 modern First Amendment law places meaningful limits on the 
control that governmental authorities may exercise over streets, parks, and 
other public spaces central to urban life.  It also stringently protects the 
anonymity that individuals may retain in such public spaces—for example, 
9-15, 23-24 and accompanying text. 
 32. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1480-81 (2004). 
 33. See id. at 1434-49. 
 34. See id. at 1357-59, 1366-74. 
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when they distribute unsigned leaflets or present controversial views to 
strangers on a public street.  These limits suggest there are constitutional 
boundaries on the extent to which governments may transform urban 
spaces (and other public spaces) in which their citizens live.  While cities 
have significant freedom to redesign themselves, they may not trade away 
those elements of the urban environment that have evolved into crucial 
supports for freedom of expression and intellectual exploration.  In this 
sense, the liberty-enabling features of streets, parks, and plazas are akin to 
historic buildings that have become central to a city or a neighborhood’s 
identity.  They have become an integral and defining part of Americans’ 
constitutional life and, as such, have earned a claim to preservation that 
distinguishes them from other features of the urban landscape.35
Part I of this article examines how some commentators can plausibly 
argue that constitutional liberty and privacy protections do not protect the 
individual liberty and privacy that modern individuals have come to expect 
in many public spaces, particularly in urban environments.
 
36
 
 35. This is not to say that existing First Amendment jurisprudence prevents cities from 
closing any given park, street or plaza.  Rather, it assures that when governments do provide 
citizens such features of cities – as they can hardly avoid doing – they provide them under 
rules and conditions that respect the basic First Amendment requirements applicable to these 
public spaces. 
  Why is it not 
clear that identification technologies that might chill speech run afoul of 
speech protections?  Constitutional liberalism, this section points out, 
makes this question a difficult one, because it is marked by scrupulous 
neutrality towards different visions of “the good life.”  In other words, the 
constitutional order does not condemn those who choose a communitarian 
way of life and favor those who prefer individualism.  Rather, it tolerates 
both of these (and other) preferences about one’s social and cultural 
environment, and leaves citizens free to opt for the life of their choice.  
Given this neutrality, one might argue, it would be wrong to interpret the 
United States Constitution as somehow forcing individualism on cities and 
their inhabitants if a majority of them may be willing to forsake it in return 
for greater security or other benefits.  Arguments based on constitutional 
interpretation present additional reasons to let city governments (or 
inhabitants) abandon long-standing freedoms which are characteristic of 
urban life.  For example, proponents of the view that constitutional 
interpretation must remain deeply anchored in the “original understanding” 
of the Constitution’s text might argue that this understanding could not 
have included protection of modern urban freedoms.  Making this argument 
quite plausible is the fact that the liberties that late-nineteenth and early 
 36. See infra notes 39-71 and accompanying text. 
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twentieth century observers (such as Simmel) celebrated in urban 
environments did not exist when the Constitution was drafted a century 
earlier.  At that time, many of the great American metropolises were less 
distinctly urban and more akin to small towns. 
If, by contrast, one believes that constitutional interpretation should 
change as society changes, then why not let conceptions of First 
Amendment and other constitutional rights change with developments in 
citizens’ conceptions of liberty, privacy, and security, and the proper 
relationship between them?  To the extent that city life is marked by 
continual transformation of cities’ physical structure and social fabric, 
perhaps the proper forum for individualists and communitarians to spar 
over the direction of such transformation is not in constitutional law at all, 
but in the vigorous policy debates that play a vital role in democratic 
governance.  The future of urban existence may very well be shaped by 
debates over architecture, park design, and zoning laws rather than debates 
over the meaning of the First Amendment. 
 Part II sketches an answer to these challenges and suggests a reason 
for courts and others to find that freedom-enabling institutions that did not 
exist earlier in American history, and might cease to exist in the future, 
deserve certain constitutional protection while they are here.37
In Part III, I explain why defending the urban freedom identified by 
Georg Simmel deserves a place in constitutional jurisprudence for largely 
the same reason.  Like the virtual liberation offered by the Internet, city life 
offered and continues to offer an invaluable refuge for substantial 
expressive activity and intellectual exploration that would be far more 
elusive without this type of urban existence.
  This part 
addresses these challenges by explaining that however counterintuitive this 
claim may seem, it receives a strong and implicit endorsement in the way 
that scholars and courts analyze the First Amendment, the Internet, and the 
intersection between them.  In short, I suggest that it is difficult to make 
sense of our modern jurisprudence of First Amendment rights, especially as 
they relate to anonymous communication and association on the Internet 
and elsewhere, unless one allows room in our constitutional law for a 
jurisprudence that “captures” and preserves social incarnations of liberty 
and privacy that were not yet in existence when the Constitution was 
drafted.  Courts defenses of Internet anonymity provide one example of 
such a liberty-preserving doctrine. 
38
 
 37. See infra notes 
  It provides individuals with 
an incredibly rich bazaar of ideas, and allows them to browse among these 
72-119 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 120-163 and accompanying text. 
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ideas, substantially free from outside monitoring or control. While First 
Amendment law does not single out urban environments for 
protection, it protects such environments indirectly by preserving 
certain opportunities that are characteristic of modern urban life: 
opportunities for giving speeches to large crowds, for confronting 
strangers with ideas they may find unfamiliar or provocative, or for 
speaking or gathering information in the anonymity of the crowd.  A 
person may sometimes find such opportunities in small towns as well 
as cities.  But it is in urban environments where one finds the most 
numerous and frequent opportunities both for broadcasting one’s 
views and for hiding them.  And I suggest here that defending this 
feature of urban settings does not undercut our constitutional regime’s 
tolerance of, and neutrality toward, different visions of the good, so long as 
we are assured that the freedom-enhancing environment of the city can 
continue to exist alongside of, and not in place of, alternative forms of 
collective life. 
 
PART I: URBAN SPACES, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT 
TO REDESIGN ONE’S COMMUNITY 
Urban environments have long been a refuge for those seeking the 
freedom that comes with privacy and anonymity.  As Jane Jacobs notes, 
“[p]rivacy is precious in cities” and far more attainable there than in most 
places: “In small settlements everyone knows your affairs.  In the city 
everyone does not—only those you choose to tell will know much about 
you.”39  That may well be changing.  Indeed, some cities may soon be 
among the places where it is hardest to escape public identification and 
monitoring.  Thanks to London’s embrace of ubiquitous cameras, the 
average Londoner is now captured on video hundreds of times each day.40
Many officials and municipal governments in America are exploring 
ways to ensure that such images capture not only faces, but also names.  
New York City, for example, has reportedly explored mounting a hundred 
cameras equipped with face recognition technology over Times Square.
 
41
 
 39. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 58 (3d. ed. 1961). 
  
Proposals for requiring information-loaded ID cards have become more 
 40. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places 
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 214 (2002). 
 41. See Morning Edition: Profile: Use of Surveillance Cameras in New York City and 
Other Places Around the World (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 25, 2002, 10:00 a.m.) 
(discussing talks about installing “a hundred cameras with face recognition software in 
Times Square”), transcript available at LEXIS News Library. 
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common since 2001.  And where such emerging technology does not work, 
law enforcement might take advantage of a host of other recent 
developments—including electronic tollways and ubiquitous cell phone 
and credit card usage—to track people and retrace their activities on a 
particular day. 
Does this transformation of anonymous spaces into constantly-
monitored zones raise constitutional difficulties?  One might think the 
answer is clear.  The Constitution protects anonymous speech and 
association.42  It also shields individuals from attempts to “contract the 
spectrum of available knowledge.”43  It provides people with privacy 
protection, which they take with them as they “step from their homes onto 
the public sidewalks.”44  As Christopher Slobogin has demonstrated, 
pervasive public video surveillance has dire consequences for the 
“anonymity in public [that] promotes freedom of action and an open 
society.”45
While I will ultimately argue that the Constitution provides precisely 
such protection, this argument is not as straightforward as it has seemed to 
some privacy advocates.  On the contrary, anyone who wishes to invoke 
constitutional anonymity protections to limit use of face recognition and 
other identification technologies must carefully address a number of 
significant objections. 
  How then could one deny that the Constitution stands as a 
barrier against new surveillance measures in cities that reduce anonymity, 
“chill” information-gathering, and monitor people on streets and 
sidewalks? 
A.  Constitutional Neutrality, Meaning, and Change: Skepticism About 
a Constitutionally-Preferred Vision of Urban Life 
One of the defining features of constitutional liberalism is its neutrality 
between different visions of the good life, including those that place more 
 
 42. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–69 
(2002) (declaring unconstitutional a town law requiring those who wish to canvass door-to-
door to first identify themselves in a permit application filed with the mayor’s office and 
made available for public inspection); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 
334, 342-43, 356 (1995) (striking down an Ohio law prohibiting the distribution of 
anonymous campaign literature and taking note of “a respected tradition of anonymity in the 
advocacy of political causes”) (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (forbidding the state of Alabama from 
compelling the NAACP to disclose its membership lists). 
 43. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
 44. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 45. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity, supra note 40, at 240-251. 
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emphasis on community and accountability than on individualism and 
anonymity.  As philosopher Charles Larmore notes, “the distinctive liberal 
notion is the neutrality of the state.”46  To maintain this neutrality, a liberal 
regime cannot promote partisan claims about what “freedom must include,” 
such as calls for enhanced “self-realization,” or greater availability of 
“‘meaningful choices.’”47
Such neutrality, of course, would seem absurd if it were understood to 
permit the rise of an Orwellian state regime in which officials use spy 
cameras to keep watch over citizens and ensure their unquestioning loyalty 
by crushing all signs of dissent.  Certainly, this is the image many writers 
invoke to argue against the unrestricted use of face recognition and other 
new surveillance technologies.  Indeed, the telestory of “The Prisoner,” 
described at the beginning of this essay, portrays a community with such 
coercive features.
  If it did so, a modern state may find itself 
forcing such specific conceptions of freedom on citizens who deeply 
disagree with and resent being subject to them. In the absence of liberal 
neutrality, for example, religious and cultural groups organized around 
tradition might be required to adhere to individualistic practices at odds 
with their traditional values.  To avoid subjecting groups to values deeply 
at odds with their own, liberal states thus defend conceptions of 
constitutional liberties that are neutral between specific visions of the good. 
48  In “The Prisoner,” village authorities may not only 
punish dissenters with ostracism and social disdain often characteristic of 
tight-knit communities, but also with techniques of confinement, physical 
harm, or corrective medical procedures characteristic of totalitarian 
states.49  Clearly, “neutrality” toward such institutionalized intolerance or 
physical coercion would hardly be consistent with the fundamental 
principles of constitutional liberalism.  Advocates of liberal neutrality, such 
as Larmore, recognize that liberalism strongly supports the basic freedom 
entailed in “the right of the person not to face unjustifiable interference by 
the state.”50
Totalitarianism, however, is not the only form of collective life that can 
be fitted to a landscape covered with face recognition and other 
identification devices.  One might see such a landscape not as a ready-made 
ground for totalitarianism, but as a technologically-updated version of 
  At a minimum, liberal principles of neutrality require that the 
government tolerate those who disagree with its policies, and refrain from 
silencing or harming them. 
 
 46. CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 42, 47 (1987). 
 47. Id. (internal quotes in original) 
 48. See CARAZZE & OSWALD, supra note 2. 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 152-61, 182-89. 
 50. LARMORE, supra note 46, at 47. 
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small town life.  As I noted above, David Brin shows that a camera-covered 
city need not be a dark and authoritarian one.51  Instead of paving the way 
for an omnipotent government, with godlike power over its subjects, 
cameras and identification technologies might be used to empower citizens, 
and to enlarge their power to keep track of both their fellow citizens and 
elected officials.52  Instead of bringing a nightmarish and alien future, 
video surveillance and instant identification might thus revive a more 
comfortable and familiar past where people know, and know about, their 
neighbors and others in their communities.53
Portrayed in these communitarian terms, a closely-surveilled city has a 
very different status in a liberal constitutional order than it does if it is seen 
as a manifestation of totalitarianism.  Whereas totalitarianism is entirely 
incompatible with fundamental principles of constitutional liberalism, this 
is not true of the preference for an intimate and close-knit community, in 
which accountability may trump individuality.  On the contrary, such 
communities are entitled to the same tolerance in a liberal order as any 
other type of community.  After all, a tolerant state does not demand that 
small, tightly-knit communities transform themselves into larger, more 
anonymous and impersonal environments.  It does not hold such a 
community in violation of First Amendment freedoms simply because 
individuals may feel less comfortable speaking their minds there than if 
they lived in a more urban setting, where views might be more diverse or 
where their dissent would be less noticeable.  If a small town is free to 
remain a small town, why aren’t those who oversee a city just as free to 
make it more like a small town?  In short, while some members of a liberal 
society may treasure the urban anonymity and freedom that Georg Simmel 
said could not be found outside the modern metropolis, many city dwellers 
(particularly in an era of deep anxiety about security) may want their 
environment to be less individualistic and more like those one finds in 
smaller communities.  One might argue that in a tolerant liberal 
constitutional order, this choice should be just as permissible as a more 
individualistic one. 
 
This vision of constitutional liberalism has found expression in many 
recent debates about how liberal societies should react to “illiberal” 
religious or cultural communities in their midst.  William Galston, for 
example, notes that the liberty of a pluralistic society must “protect the 
ability of individuals and groups to live in ways that others would regard as 
 
 51. BRIN, supra note 23, at 9-10. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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unfree.”54 And Chandran Kukathas argues that if modern communities are 
to be tolerant communities, they must tolerate highly traditional and anti-
individualistic communities that, instead of welcoming dissent, choose to 
“ostracize the individual who refuses to conform to [their] norms.”55
Such an argument also finds support in the fact that while the First 
Amendment bars state censorship, it cannot and does not eliminate the 
social pressures that often make dissent or unconventional speech 
uncomfortable.  Thus, it would seem that to the extent a technological 
framework simply exposes us and our activities to criticism and possible 
ridicule from those in our community, it does not, for this reason, amount 
to constitutionally-forbidden censorship.  As Lee Bollinger notes, there is a 
stark difference under our constitutional regime and culture between “the 
use of legal penalties against speech activities” and the “employment of 
nonlegal forms of coercion.”
  If 
liberal constitutional orders must make room in their midst for traditional 
communities that adopt illiberal practices, perhaps there is an equally 
strong case to be made that they should make room for cities which, while 
perhaps very individualistic in certain respects and more tolerant of 
unconventionality and idiosyncrasy than many traditional cultural groups, 
choose to keep closer watch over their citizens in order to deter, or respond 
to, crime and terrorism. 
56  While legal penalties on speech are 
severely restricted by the Constitution, non-legal penalties are not only 
permitted, but often encouraged.  People may and do respond to offensive 
speech with the “myriad of coercive responses typically at [their] disposal,” 
including “ridicule or humiliation” and “any number of forms of social 
shunning.”  Further, people can “withhold various practical benefits, like 
employment opportunities.”57  Such penalties, as Kukathas notes, are 
available to the cultural and religious communities within a liberal society, 
and may be utilized to enforce adherence to their norms.58
 
 54. William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 869, 877 (1999). 
  To the extent 
that the presence of public cameras and biometric identification devices 
simply makes us more accountable to the community for our behavior—
and to the state for criminal acts—why, one might ask, should a liberal 
constitutional society make this option unavailable to elected 
representatives and citizens?  Far from ruling out this option, the liberal 
 55. Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY 
CULTURES 248 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
 56. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 13 (1986). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Kukathas, supra note 55, at 248. 
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constitutional commitment to individual freedom would seem to demand 
that people be left free to choose it.  Individual freedom, in other words, 
demands that city dwellers be free to forsake the individualism frequently 
associated with cities and transform their environment into one where 
accountability is more inescapable (and threats to public safety are more 
detectable). 
Such an argument based upon political theory might be bolstered by two 
very different arguments about constitutional interpretation.  On the one 
hand, one might draw on “originalist” interpretation to underscore that 
judges should hesitate before reading the First Amendment as protecting 
individual freedoms of a sort that did not exist when the First Amendment 
was drafted.  At the end of the eighteenth century, after all, one could not 
find the same degree of anonymity and variety that Simmel observed in the 
early twentieth century.  For example, “unlike later and larger 
Philadelphias, the eighteenth century town was a community.”  Its 
population numbered 23,700 on the eve of the revolution and its “narrow 
compass” ensured that citizens of different groups lived “jumbled together” 
and interacted frequently.59  It thus seems odd to think that the First 
Amendment was designed to defend an environmental background for free 
expression and thought that did not exist at the time.  On the other hand, 
one can espouse the notion of a living constitution, whose protections 
change with changing conceptions of liberty, but this arguably leaves cities 
with as much freedom to adopt new expansive surveillance systems.  Under 
this ”evolving constitution” approach, First Amendment protection might 
evolve to make room for citizens’ changing preferences about how cities 
should behave (as reflected in their decisions or those of legislators and 
administrators charged with honoring such preferences).  Jane Jacobs, after 
all, referred to rebuilding a city in the right way as a “wonderful 
challenge,” providing each citizen with the “chance to reshape the city and 
to make it the kind of city that he likes, and that others will too.”60
 
 59. See Sam Bass Warner, Philadelphia: The Private City, in AMERICAN URBAN 
HISTORY: AN INTERPRETIVE READER WITH COMMENTARIES 54, 55 (Alexander B. Callow, Jr. 
ed., 3d ed. 1982). 
  While 
Jacobs, like Simmel, recognized that such a city life may require leaving 
room for “the incongruous, the vulgar, or the strange,” she sought to 
preserve room for these elements of city life by inviting city dwellers to 
exercise control over their environment, not by recruiting courts to 
constitutionally insulate it from such control. 
 60. Jane Jacobs, Downtown is for People, in THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 157, 184 
(William H. Whyte, Jr. ed., 1958). 
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B.  Argument from Judicial Competence 
There is another complementary argument that constitutional protections 
should not be the safeguards of urban freedom.  The argument is that courts 
are, by their nature, woefully ill-equipped to assess and make binding 
decisions on the social and physical conditions that make such freedom 
possible.  This is because such conditions are as likely to be features of a 
city’s physical architecture as they are of its legal regime.  Thus, most of 
the contemporary writers who inherited Simmel’s admiration for urban 
individualism aimed their impassioned defense of it not at courts deciding 
constitutional questions, but rather at city-dwellers thinking about how they 
want their environment to be designed.  William H. Whyte, for example, 
celebrated the city’s “variety and concentration, its tension, its hustle and 
bustle,” and harshly condemned any attempt at transformation into 
something more calm and rural. 61  Many city planners, he complained, 
aimed to “banish the most wonderful [of] city features—the street” and 
replace its vigorous heterogeneity with “anti-cities . . . sealed off from 
surrounding neighborhoods as if they were set in cornfields miles away.”62  
Jane Jacobs likewise had harsh criticism for “the city destroying ideas” of 
those who wished to replace the heterogeneity and privacy of cities with 
the togetherness and homogeneity of small towns.63  These writers 
celebrate the opportunities for individuality and heterogeneity that Simmel 
identified as the hallmark of urban culture.  Decades before the spread of 
cameras on public streets and parks, they worried that other attempts to 
redesign the structure of cities would undercut these distinctive and 
invaluable features of urban life.  Thus, they called on city planners to 
reject popular conceptions inherited from the “Garden City” movement and 
the “Decentrists,” designed to make city life more like that in rural 
settings.64  For similar reasons, they called on them to recognize as 
wrongheaded and harmful the “Radiant City” design proposed by Le 
Corbusier with the underground streets and high-rises intended to unclutter 
streets and park areas of pedestrians and obstacles.65
 
 61. William H. Whyte, Jr., Introduction, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 7 (William H. 
Whyte, Jr. ed., 1958). 
  But it would have 
seemed bizarre to take these complaints to a courtroom; rather, their 
 62. Id. at 10. 
 63. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 39, at 20, 62-
63 (condemning the movement by “Decentrists” of the 1920s to “thin [cities] out, and 
disperse their enterprises and populations into smaller, separated cities or, better yet, towns” 
and city areas designed to promote “togetherness,” such that instead of casual and limited 
contact on sidewalks, one shares significant amounts of one’s life with neighbors). 
 64. See id. at 16-21. 
 65. See id. at 21-24. 
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assumption was that the freedom and diversity-enhancing character of 
cities could only be saved if citizens could be persuaded it was worth 
saving (and made to see what was needed to save it).66  This assumption 
appears to have held sway as newer defenders of urban individualism and 
diversity revise Jacobs’ and Whyte’s criticisms of attempts to model cities 
on country towns to critique “technocommunitarian” reconceptions of 
urban space.67  Responding to claims that cyberspace and other new 
technological innovations can superimpose the togetherness and 
transparency of community over the “difference and disorder” of modern 
urban life, Kevin Robins argues that such a remaking of cities would do 
substantial harm.68
In short, the working assumption of such defenders of urban 
individualism appears to be that it must be defended in a democratic give-
and-take, and not by making their vision of city life constitutionally 
required.  Even writers such as Jerry Frug, who argue that the defense of 
urban diversity and individuality requires a certain legal structure, and not 
just a certain physical architecture,
  However, he does not present this danger as harm to 
the constitutional order, but rather to the fabric of city life. 
69 generally see the defense of this legal 
structure as a task for citizens and legislators, not as a task for courts giving 
force to First Amendment freedoms.70  This is due in part to the fact that 
the individualism and anonymity of city life is not an unmixed blessing.  
Instead, it comes with less social support than one finds in more traditional 
settings and makes possible crime, and fear of crime, not present in such 
settings.71
 
 66. See Jacobs, Downtown is for People, supra note 
  A jurisprudence of rights may be ill-suited for reconciling the 
different values at stake, and helping city dwellers decide which values 
they prefer in the event they cannot have everything they want.  Perhaps 
constitutional freedoms are affected by developments in city design and 
architecture, but this does not mean that courts have anything to say or do 
about them. 
60, at 183-84. 
 67. See Kevin Robins, Foreclosing on the City? The Bad Idea of Virtual Urbanism, in 
TECHNOCITIES: THE CULTURE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION 34-59 
(John Downey & Jim McGuigan eds., 1999).  Robins uses the term “technocommunitarian” 
primarily to describe (and critique) the notion that one can restore a lost sense of community 
through new means of networked communication.  I use it here to refer more broadly to any 
argument that favors reviving the characteristics of a small community by technologically 
transforming the urban environment. 
 68. Id. at 45, 47. 
 69. See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1104-08 
(1996). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 1104-05, 1107-08 (proposing redesign of “local government law” 
regarding land use regulations). 
 71. See id. 
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PART II: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE IMPERATIVE OF 
PRESERVING SPACES FOR UNMONITORED EXPLORATION AND 
EXPRESSION 
What then could be wrong with modern cities deciding to become high-
tech, “easily-spanned village[s]?”  Why can’t they decide for themselves if 
this is a model of collective life they find attractive, and make that decision 
free of judicially-imposed constraints?  I argue in this Part that a closer 
examination of First Amendment law, and particularly First Amendment 
law on anonymity on the Internet and elsewhere, shows that there are 
potential problems with both halves of “technocommunitarianism.” 
A.  The Electronic Village I: First Amendment Problems with the 
Technological Perfection of Monitoring in Urban Spaces 
First, there is a potential problem with the “high tech” part of this 
transformation—not because use of modern law enforcement technology is 
unwise or unacceptable, but because of how a futuristic version of “village 
life” might feel when it is recreated with automated biometric eyes instead 
of curious neighbors.  In short, a certain amount of individual freedom 
might be lost in the translation of informal monitoring by neighbors into 
constant and pervasive electronic watching.  One concern lies in the 
difference between the respective consequences of human and electronic 
monitoring.  Video and audio tapes record one’s private life in greater and 
more vivid detail than does human memory.  As Justice Harlan noted in his 
famous dissent in a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, in a world 
where “recording . . . insures full and accurate disclosure of all that is said, 
free of the possibility of error and oversight that inheres in human 
reporting . . . [w]ords would be measured a good deal more carefully and 
communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations were being 
transmitted and transcribed.”72  Such recording, worried Harlan, might well 
“smother that spontaneity . . . that liberates daily life.”73  Officials, of 
course, could surveill a citizen even without video cameras, but his public 
privacy would still be protected by “the likelihood that the listener will 
either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s inability to 
reformulate a conversation.”74
 
 72. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
  Whereas memories tend to fade, and the 
feelings associated with an event often become less powerful, hearing or 
watching a tape of private actions tends to revive memories of, and 
reactions to, a person’s behavior.  Such tapes also provide an objective 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 788. 
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reference point that makes it harder for a person to explain and retell an 
action she took by placing it in a broader context; for example, by 
describing it in light of motives, concerns, or other background facts that 
are not as vivid and uncontestable as the images captured in video.  In other 
words, it deprives the person of an element of freedom and autonomy that 
is likely to be present even in communities where everyday life is subject to 
close and frequent observation. 
Another concern lies in the extent to which biometrically-equipped 
cameras might eliminate even the seclusion and insulation from 
observation that is available to people in places where everyone knows 
everyone else.  Even in a small town individuals can find places in public 
to privately read a book or a letter, or have a private conversation, by 
finding a physically remote area or checking to ensure that no one is near.  
By contrast, in a world where cameras or microphones strewn throughout 
public spaces can “zoom in” on individuals unaware of their presence, a 
person may find it difficult or impossible to travel far enough away from 
such electronic eyes and ears to escape their range.75  Whereas other people 
might find it hard to identify them from a distance, a biometrically 
equipped camera could magnify a person’s image and match it against a 
database.76
In addition, the decision of cities to transform themselves into 
electronically-watched villages might be problematic for another related 
reason.  Not only might the electronic watching be more intense than the 
observation to which people are subject in small towns and villages, it may 
also be used in more worrisome ways.  More specifically, there is a 
significant difference between observations by one’s neighbors and 
observations systematically collected by the state.  Admittedly, people may 
often be more comfortable being observed by (or observable to) police than 
by curious neighbors.  This is because police looking at video footage or 
individuals picked out by face recognition scanners are more likely to be 
looking only for evidence of criminal activity than are curious onlookers, 
who may instead attend to and gossip about irrelevant idiosyncrasies.
 
77
 
 75. See ROSEN, supra note 
  To 
the extent the state strays from a focus on law enforcement, however, the 
potential harm it does can be much greater given its monopoly on legalized 
force.  State officials and police are also more likely to notice and be 
offended by political dissent of the sort that courts have often identified as 
a core (if not the core) of First Amendment protections: citizens may be 
16, at 36-37. 
 76. Id. at 51. 
 77. And the state is also likely to be subject to greater scrutiny and accountability than 
are private individuals.  See BRIN, supra note 23, at 9. 
BLITZ_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:04 PM 
120 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL Vol.XXXII 
less likely to criticize the government if they know that the government 
itself is watching.  Such a problem will not necessarily be cured by Brin’s 
recommendation that citizens be allowed as much access to cameras and 
identification technologies as police and other officials;78
This, then, is one way in which electronic surveillance and identification 
technologies may run afoul of the First Amendment and other 
constitutional provisions where garden-variety social pressure does not.  
Government-operated electronic monitoring networks might be more 
inescapable than community observation ever could be, and differs 
importantly from such informal viewing and reporting in the fact that it is 
government-operated.  Both of these factors have constitutional 
significance. 
 while citizens can 
theoretically use such access to detect and punish abusive action by 
government authorities, in practice government opponents might be more 
likely to hold their tongues than to openly challenge the government in 
court or elsewhere.  Moreover, such a chilling effect on opposition speech 
may happen without any visible sign of abuse, making it difficult for 
citizens to rally opposition to it. 
First, while the presence of curious neighbors does not mandate that a 
person disclose his identity, the presence of pervasive biometric devices 
effectively does – at least when these devices do what they are meant to do 
and effectively “unmask” anonymous individuals.  This fact weakens the 
basis for one argument against placing any constitutional limits on face 
recognition or other biometric identification.  One might argue that what 
First Amendment anonymity cases have celebrated and defended is not the 
anonymity of the crowd or street corner, but the anonymity of speech or 
associational support.  Such anonymity, the argument goes, is found not in 
city squares or any other distinctly urban settings, but in anonymous 
authorship and behind-the-scenes organizational activity.  Thus, while 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay could publish their 
Federal Papers under a pseudonym (“Publius”),79
 
 78. See BRIN, supra note 
 this did not mean that 
they could prevent neighbors from recognizing them as they walked down 
the street.  Similarly, NAACP members could support that organization 
without the State of Alabama learning their names, but this did not mean 
that they could participate in a televised march or demonstration and keep 
their participation a secret.  While the Supreme Court prohibited compelled 
disclosure of membership lists to the government, it did not prohibit police 
23, at 4, 9. 
 79. See Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to 
Anonymity, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2001-2002 57 (James L. Swanson ed., 2002). 
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observation of public activities by the group or its members.80  Fourth 
Amendment case law similarly protects “reasonable expectations of 
privacy,” but does not change the fact that “[n]o person can have a 
reasonable expectation that . . . his face will be a mystery to the world.”81
But a pervasive and inescapable network of identification devices blurs 
this distinction between coincidental recognition and compelled 
disclosure.
  
In short, this logic leads to the conclusion that what is constitutionally 
impermissible is not identification by neighbors, acquaintances, or even 
nearby police officers; rather, it is government-compelled disclosure of 
one’s identity in connection with speech or association. 
82  While face recognition (or other biometric identification) has 
sometimes been portrayed as a high-tech equivalent of happenstance 
identification by a nearby acquaintance, it can in fact operate in a way that 
is practically much more like the disclosure requirements.  The very act of 
walking on a city street in such a world, for instance, makes it impossible 
not to identify oneself to town officials.  A door-to-door solicitor may not 
have to go through the burden of informing a town of her identity, by 
filling out a form or signing a piece of campaign literature.  Yet she does 
have to identify herself as a condition of performing such activity, simply 
because the activity cannot be carried out without revealing her identity.  
Thus, the pervasiveness of high-tech camera networks may well run afoul 
of the First Amendment anonymity protections enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in the 2002 case of Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, 
Inc. v. Stratton.83  In that case, the Court held that door-to-door solicitors 
had a right to maintain their anonymity as they engaged in protected First 
Amendment activity.84
Second, the fact that government officials operate or have regular access 
to cameras and face recognition scanners has constitutional significance, 
even if they are not the only ones with such access.  This is because while 
the First Amendment does not protect us (at least not directly) from 
informal community pressures towards conformity, it does protect  us from 
any such pressure when it comes from the government.
 
85
 
 80. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
  Indeed, 
government disclosure requirements are constitutionally problematic even 
 81. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973). 
 82. Even recognition that is planned—for example, when a private eye follows a 
person—is not as inescapable as compelled disclosure, or as surveillance in a world of 
pervasive and effective face-recognition cameras. 
 83. 536 U.S. 150, 169 (2002). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Comm., 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996). 
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if the government itself refrains from imposing any punishment on speech 
or association: Even if it merely facilitates community pressure or private 
retaliation against a dissenter—for example, by forcing that dissenter to 
reveal his connection to unpopular views or unorthodox ideas—it will 
likely run afoul of First Amendment protections.  Thus, the village of 
Stratton was barred in Watchtower Bible from collecting identifying 
information on solicitors on behalf of (and for examination by) its 
residents.86  And Congress was similarly barred from requiring individuals 
interested in receiving sexually-explicit cable channels from identifying 
themselves and their interests to cable carriers.  In that case, the Court 
noted that the requirement would “restrict viewing by subscribers who fear 
for their reputations should the operator, advertently or inadvertently, 
disclose the list of those who wish to watch the ‘patently offensive’ 
channel.”87
Even if the government does not directly silence protected speech, it 
causes First Amendment harm when it aids silencing by pointing such 
speech out to wielders of private power who will likely find it 
objectionable.  In such circumstances, the government’s role is not unlike 
that of a military unit that sends up flares or shines a spotlight so that a 
separate attacking force can identify its target.  In so doing, that unit clearly 
participates in, and aids, such an attack (made problematic when the object 
of the attack is constitutionally-protected speech or association). 
  The fact that punishment of such interests would likely come 
from community members and not from government itself could not make 
such a self-identification requirement permissible. 
Of course, this analogy is much weaker if the government’s role in 
undercutting anonymity is not to target any particular viewpoint or topic 
(for example, the sexually-explicit programming targeted in Denver Area 
Educational Television Consortium88
 
 86. Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 150, 155 n.2, 169. 
) but rather to alter the environment in 
such a way that everyone can see what anyone else says or does.  In such a 
circumstance, the government does not so much highlight anything with a 
focused spotlight as it shines “light” everywhere so that everyone can 
benefit from the increased safety and certainty that comes with having a 
clear view of the surrounding environment (as well as the potential support 
of others who can better see threats to the community).  Still, such 
viewpoint and content neutrality will not necessarily save a government 
disclosure requirement, or a functionally similar measure that wrests 
anonymity from speakers or information-seekers who desire it.  The 
 87. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium at 754. 
 88. Id. at 732. 
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Supreme Court made this clear in Buckley v. Valeo.89  It concluded in that 
case that there is an inherent First Amendment against the forced disclosure 
of a speaker’s identity; any government measures that threaten this right 
must be subjected to “exacting scrutiny,” which is necessary “because 
compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the 
exercise of First Amendment rights.” 90  In McIntyre v. Ohio Election 
Commission,91 the Court made it even clearer that its protection for 
anonymity goes beyond protecting unpopular views.  An anonymous 
speaker has a First Amendment right to maintain that anonymity, it said, 
not only when “economic or official retaliation” lurks just around the 
corner, but also when a person simply has “a desire to preserve as much of 
one’s privacy as possible.”92  Even when the motivation is not fear of 
harassment or harm, “the interest in having anonymous works enter the 
marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in 
requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.”93  Thus, the Court in McIntyre 
found that the restrictions on anonymous campaign pamphlets in that case 
could pass constitutional muster only under the strictest form of review 
(i.e.,”strict scrutiny”): they had to be “narrowly tailored to serve a an 
overriding state interest.”94  The Court was able to base its holding in part 
on the fact that the statute it was striking down was directed only at certain 
speech contents, namely speech designed to influence an election. 95 
However, even when the Court confronted a content-neutral restriction on 
in the 2002 Watchtower Bible case, it made clear that it would also treat 
such restrictions with significant skepticism.  Although not expressly 
applying strict scrutiny, it stated that even content-neutral disclosure  
requirements for door-to-door solicitors were a “dramatic departure 
from our national heritage and constitutional tradition” and noted 
that it is not carefully tailored to the ends it is purported to serve.96
To some extent, perhaps, this is because even disclosure measures that 
are neutral on paper, and neutral in design, may predictably harm minority 
points of view much more than majority viewpoints.  As David Ogden and 
Joel Nichols point out, “by their inherent nature bans on anonymity do not 
impose burdens equally on all expression.”
 
97
 
 89. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
  It is rather “the most 
 90. Id. at 64. 
 91. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 92. Id. at 341-42. 
 93. Id. at 342. 
    94    Id. at 347 
    95     Id. at, 345-46. 
    96    Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 165-66. 
 97. David W. Ogden & Joel A. Nichols, The Right to Anonymity Under the First 
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controversial views, the fringe political parties and candidates, the 
unorthodox ideas, and the least popular advocacy groups or religious sects 
that will principally be deterred by bans on anonymous speech.”98
Accordingly, a problem arises when city governments seek to convert 
cities into closely-monitored, “easily-spanned villages.”  The conversion 
may result not simply in an insular, tight-knit community with little privacy 
and anonymity, but in an extreme, technologically-distorted version of such 
a community where the harm to privacy and autonomy is more extensive, 
and comes in large part from a source—namely, the state—that is not 
constitutionally permitted to inflict it (at least in the absence of a 
compelling state interest). 
  But 
McIntyre’s extensive anonymity protection is justified not only as a shield 
against the majority punishment of minority viewpoints, but also as a shield 
that protects numerous kinds of speech or information-seeking that might 
suffer or wither away in the harsh light of publicity.  This shield can afford 
protection for speech or intellectual exploration that might line up with 
majority views, but offend particular members of a speaker’s family or 
circle of associations; tentative views that individuals might be hesitant to 
offer as a firm statement of their own beliefs (or a statement that could be 
mistakenly viewed as such); and speech that gains some of its strength (or 
even content) from the fact of the author’s anonymity.  Such First 
Amendment activity can of course be threatened or “chilled” by social 
pressure or by fear of private penalties even when the government does not 
take any action to disable it—and indeed, even when the government 
affirmatively protects it.  These penalties do not mean, however, that the 
government can add its own damage on top of that caused by society.  On 
the contrary, the conclusion of McIntyre appears to be that the First 
Amendment bars such damage.  Thus, to the extent that government-
installed cameras and identification measures give government actors a role 
in undermining anonymity that they do not play in the informal monitoring 
of small towns and villages, they may well raise distinct First Amendment 
problems. 
 
B.  The Electronic Village II: First Amendment Problems with 
Reviving Traditional Monitoring in Urban Spaces 
The video cameras and face recognition scanners emerging in cities, 
moreover, are problematic not only to the extent that their intrusiveness 
 
Amendment, 49 A.P.R. FED. LAW. 44, 47 (2002). 
 98. Id. 
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goes beyond that of a community lacking in privacy but also to the extent 
that they succeed in recreating such an environment.  In other words, 
“technocommunitarianism” is problematic not solely because of the 
technological intrusion it makes possible, but because of its 
communitarianism.  This is a controversial claim.  To the extent a panoptic 
city-wide surveillance can be portrayed as a Frankenstein monster, alien to 
anything American society has seen or tolerated in the past, it is relatively 
easy to defend the claim that such a freakish and non-traditional 
environment is at odds with traditional liberties.  But such an accusation is 
far more difficult to defend when a city’s defensive monitoring of its 
inhabitants takes away no more privacy or anonymity than Americans 
would lose by moving from a city to a smaller, more intimate community.  
Nor is it wholly justified: Cities have changed significantly over the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  They will likely continue to 
change over the course of the twenty-first century.  Furthermore, they may, 
in certain respects, become more like smaller communities which, far from 
being at odds with freedom or individualism, are often freely chosen by 
individuals who prefer such environments to life in large cities.  This does 
not mean, however,  that the Constitution places no barriers at all in the 
face of government measures that would transform urban life into an 
environment considerably less private and considerably less free than it is 
now.  As Iris Marion Young points out, city life provides valuable support 
for individual freedom not just for city dwellers, but for other citizens of 
modern societies.  Such freedom is a “material given” not only for 
urbanites, but for all “those who live in advanced industrial societies”;  it 
“define[s] the lives not only of those who live in huge metropolises, but 
also of those who live in suburbs and large towns.”99  Through the medium 
of art, film, and other cultural resources, even those far outside of a city’s 
boundaries can partake in its “energy, cultural diversity, technological 
complexity, and [ ] multiplicity of . . . activities.”100
 
 99. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 237 (1990). 
  Individuals may thus 
benefit from urban freedom not only by living immersed in urban culture, 
but by borrowing from it.  Understood in this way, urban individualism 
may deserve constitutional protection not because it is superior to the more 
intimate life of a small town, but because modern freedoms can exist only 
where the opportunities found in modern cities exist alongside of, and 
supplement, such a life.  Urban individualism might receive constitutional 
protection, in other words, not because it is preferable to small town life, 
but because it serves a crucial role in a larger system of free expression that 
embraces modern citizens living both inside and outside of urban settings. 
 100. Id. 
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In this sense, the urban environment may be akin to another type of 
environment that has been more widely-recognized by scholars as 
deserving a special place in First Amendment jurisprudence: the Internet.  
Scholars have implored courts and citizens to recognize that the Internet 
empowers speakers and readers alike in unprecedented ways—and laws 
should enhance, or at least avoid reversing such empowerment.  Thus, Ann 
Branscomb writes that the Internet “promises to become one of the most 
powerful democratic tools ever devised.”101  When dealing with such an 
environment, she says, “an environment unlike any heretofore made 
available . . . [i]t would be tragic . . . [t]o saddle such a promise with an 
overload of baggage from a bygone era.”102  Lee Tien similarly argues that 
First Amendment law must register the Internet’s impressive “shift in the 
architecture of everyday communication.”103  And Yochai Benkler likewise 
touts the vast increase in “the range and diversity of information” that 
“individuals can access” online, and the ability this networked 
communication gives them to build “an autonomously conceived and lived 
life.”104
Such claims about the unprecedented possibilities of the Internet have 
been echoed in recent First Amendment decisions, and most notably in the 
Supreme Court’s first major statement on Internet speech in Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union.
 
105  Striking down Congress’s restrictions 
on indecent Web material in that case, the Court remarked that, in the age 
of the Internet and the World Wide Web, “[a]ny person or organization 
with a computer [and Internet connection has a] vast platform from which 
to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers, 
viewers, researchers, and buyers.”106
This vision of the Internet as an area where speech protection has 
extraordinary force has found expression not only in decisions about online 
censorship, but also in cases about online anonymity.  A series of cases 
have placed high hurdles in the way of plaintiff corporations trying to 
discover the identity of anonymous Internet users who allegedly defamed 
them, violated their trademark, or caused them some other alleged harm 
online.  While not leaving these plaintiffs entirely helpless, for example, 
 
 
 101. Ann Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First 
Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1640 (1995). 
 102. Id. at 1678. 
 103. Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 117, 137 (1996). 
 104. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Toward a Political Economy of 
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1267-69 (2003). 
 105. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 106. Id. at 853. 
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one court stressed that the need for any such discovery must “be balanced 
against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums 
anonymously or pseudonymously.”107  A New Jersey court similarly 
refused to let a plaintiff corporation gain easy access to its alleged 
defamers’ identity, emphasizing “the unique circumstances created by the 
advent of the Internet” and role of such circumstances in deciding cases 
where the anonymity of Internet users is at stake.108  It also demanded that 
plaintiffs meet a high threshold before they could undercut the anonymity 
of their online critics, and found that plaintiffs did not meet it.109  In short, 
such online “Jane and John Doe” cases have “generally awarded 
anonymous speech a high level of First Amendment protection,” with most 
of them “quash[ing] subpoenas or motions seeking the identities of 
defendants.”110  These cases honor many scholars’ calls to carefully guard 
the freedom-enhancing character of the Internet, and are consistent with 
Lee Tien’s observation that “lack of identity information” (and the 
anonymity resulting from it) is an important part of this freedom.111
But, if the Internet constitutes an unusual First Amendment 
environment, where certain distinctive freedom-enhancing characteristics 
must be protected, it is not the only such environment.  Almost a century 
before scholars celebrated the remarkable opportunities that the Internet 
offers for enhancing individual autonomy, Georg Simmel wrote of the 
similarly unprecedented increase in individual autonomy made possible by 
the rise of modern cities.
 
112
 
 107. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).  Thus, 
where traditional discovery rules might have allowed an angry plaintiff to run roughshod 
over this “legitimate and valuable right,” the Court formulated a higher discovery threshold 
for cases involving anonymous Web users.  Id.  Plaintiffs had to (1) “identify the missing 
party with sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real 
person or entity who could be sued in federal court;” (2) “identify all previous steps taken to 
locate the elusive defendant;” (3) “establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit 
against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss;” and (4) “file a request for discovery 
with the Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery requested 
as well as identification of a limited number of persons or entities on whom the discovery 
process might be served and for which there is reasonable likelihood that the discovery 
process will lead to identifying information that would make service of process possible.”  
Id. at 578-80. 
  In the same way that later writers marveled at 
the diversity of Web-based information sources from which individuals 
could build distinctive lives, appropriate to idiosyncratic interests, Simmel 
 108. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 767 (2001). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Victoria Smith Elkstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and 
the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 418 (2003). 
 111. Tien, supra note 103, at 163-64. 
 112. Simmel, The Metropolis and Mental Life, supra note 9, at 337-39. 
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remarked on how the diversity made possibly by urban settings nourishes 
“individual independence and the elaboration of personal peculiarities.”113  
And just as later writers would emphasize the unparalleled anonymity that 
the Internet makes possible, Simmel identified as one crucial element of 
urban freedom the fact that “we do not know by sight neighbors of years 
standing.”114
The parallel between the freedoms of the Web and the freedom of 
modern cities raises the question of whether the First Amendment—and 
other core constitutional principles—really demands neutrality between 
different forms of urban community.  Legal scholars writing about the Web 
have not demanded such neutrality with respect to cyberspace.  In other 
words, not all possible Internet architectures are equal in light of our 
constitutional values.  Thus, Lawrence Lessig warns that changes in the 
“code” that underlies the architecture of the Internet constitute a “new 
threat to liberty.”
 
115
For example, government might undermine the anonymity in Web life 
that frees people from many aspects of their identities in the physical world 
(or offer incentives for private companies to do so).
  With changes in such code, government could take a 
medium that gives individuals an unprecedented degree of liberation, and 
convert it into something marked by the constraints (and controllability) of 
ordinary space. 
116  As Tien notes, by 
removing visual cues, cyberspace “permits [individuals] to have selves 
unencumbered by appearance or gender.”117  Lessig likewise notes, “the 
architecture of the original [unregulated] cyberspace” gives to those 
disabled by blindness, deafness, or perceived unattractiveness, a significant 
freedom from these conditions.  The Internet gives them “something they 
did not have in real space,” namely, the ability to communicate easily 
without anybody knowing certain aspects of their lives.118
 
 113. Id. at 338. 
  If Web sites 
adopt and use “identification technologies” that make it a simple matter for 
the government learn who has viewed a particular site or posted a particular 
message, such measures will sharply curtail the expressive freedom the 
Internet now provides.  Furthermore, as Lessig notes, Internet anonymity 
will be on extremely precarious ground when such “identification 
technologies” incorporate “biometric keys”—requiring a person to access a 
Web site with his thumb, retina, or “whatever body part turns out to be 
 114. Id. at 331. 
 115. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 86 (1999). 
 116. Id. at 50. 
 117. Tien, supra note 103, at 166-67. 
 118. LESSIG, supra note 115, at 50. 
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cheapest to certify.”119
If there is reason to be disturbed about trading our newfound electronic 
freedoms for the familiar chains of “real space,” why isn’t there similar 
reason for concern when cities sacrifice the freedoms of real space for the 
more closely-monitored communal arrangements of an earlier age?  Why 
isn’t a biometrics-driven elimination of anonymity just as worrisome in 
urban space as it is in cyberspace?  And why should the neutrality of 
constitutional liberalism demand that courts and others stand back and let 
the future happen with respect to government-imposed changes in one of 
these environments, but not in the other? 
 
PART III: PUBLIC FORA AND ANONYMOUS SPACE 
I suggest in this article that constitutional liberalism makes no such 
demand.  On the contrary, just as courts generally appear to recognize and 
respect the significance of the Internet as the foundation for much of our 
existing marketplace of ideas, so courts have recognized in the past that 
features of urban life and other physical settings deserve a similar kind of 
respect and protection.  Indeed, our existing First Amendment 
jurisprudence already protects certain features of urban space.  Far from 
being entirely neutral, courts have long held fast to the notion that 
governments who manage public parks are compelled by the First 
Amendment to recognize and respect the fact that these spaces have 
“immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”120  For this reason, 
content-based regulations in such settings are subject to strict 
scrutiny, and even content-neutral regulations must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open 
ample alternative channels of communication.”121
As is true for the electronic space of the Internet, there is nothing 
inevitable about the vision of parks as a sanctuary for speech and debate.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s statement in Hague that such parks have 
constituted a refuge for speech, “from time out of mind,” is inaccurate.  In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, before the Supreme Court 
classified parks as “quintessential public fora” where the First Amendment 
interests are entitled to special weight, park authorities often promulgated 
strict rules about what kind of speech and assembly was permissible within 
 
 
 119. Id. at 57-58. 
 120. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
   121. Perry Education Assn’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
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park boundaries.  In England, for example, “[r]eligious and political 
meetings were a part of urban life, but as parks were seen as peaceful 
places, such potentially divisive activities were generally prohibited.”122  
Similarly, American parks of the nineteenth century made sure to keep 
“discussions of politics and religion out of park programming.”123
In the late nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes—then Chief 
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court—found that there was nothing 
impermissible about such speech restrictions.  “For the legislature 
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public 
park,” he wrote, “is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of 
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”
   
124  
This opinion was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.125
This equation between expressive freedom on the Internet and in parks 
may seem odd.  The Internet is not a quintessential public forum.  A public 
forum, such as a street or park, is a type of government-owned property.  
While it may be provided by the government or with government funds, the 
“virtual space” that exists on the Web is not government-owned space, but 
rather space that, for the most part, is owned and managed by private 
parties.  Focusing only on the government ownership of public fora, 
however, obscures the fundamental respect in which they are similar to 
virtual spaces.  The importance of both of these spaces is the 
“environmental support” they provide for speakers and information-seekers 
that might otherwise have difficulty finding a reliable and affordable space 
for First Amendment activity.  The Internet, as scholars and courts alike 
have emphasized, provides an unparalleled opportunity for expression and 
information-seeking even to those who can afford little more than a 
computer and Internet connection.  In this sense, as writers such as Lee 
Tien have pointed out, Internet speech is “cheap speech,” reminiscent of 
  The shift 
that has since occurred in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
indicates that, in contrast to Holmes’ late nineteenth-century opinion, the 
current-day Court believes that freedom of expression cannot flourish 
unless citizens have environments of a kind that can support it.  The 
Internet represents one such environment.  Municipal parks, public streets 
and plazas, and other common meeting grounds in “real space” provide 
others. 
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the writings of “lonely pamphleteers.”126  Public spaces such as streets and 
parks are similar in that they provide another key First Amendment 
resource for those who might otherwise be unable to marshal resources to 
find an audience for their views or compatriots for group expression.  As 
the Supreme Court emphasized in Hague, much like open markets where 
buyers and sellers know to look for each other, public parks and streets 
provide natural gathering points where speakers can go to find a potential 
audience for their ideas, and information-seekers can go to select from a 
thriving marketplace of ideas.127
Because such environments provide a key support for First Amendment 
communications, the basic architecture of these spaces cannot be as “value 
neutral,” or as vulnerable to hasty redesign, as are other realms within a 
liberal democracy.  In this sense they are unlike other organizational forms 
in a liberal democracy that can shift, in chameleon-like fashion, to fit the 
values of whatever group inhabits them.  The rules of a church or a private 
school or university, for example, can be bent or revised in large part to fit 
the mission and world view of whatever group runs it.  Many employers 
and residential areas can likewise accommodate themselves to specific 
value systems.  They can adopt traditional group ideals at odds with 
individualism.  Thus, many of the great thinkers of the liberal tradition 
have recognized that within a liberal order, one may find markedly illiberal 
groups.
  In the absence of such protected meeting 
grounds, “buyers” and “sellers” in the marketplace of ideas would have to 
expend far more resources (perhaps including resources they do not have) 
to find each other, or congregate (or demonstrate) with like-minded 
individuals. 
 128
 
 126. Tien, supra note 
  But in order for First Amendment expression to remain a real 
and ever-present opportunity in the midst of such social malleability, there 
are spaces within a liberal constitutional order that are set aside, and remain 
set aside, for untrammeled First Amendment debate and exploration.  Seen 
in this light, the distinctive freedoms that Georg Simmel attributed to urban 
spaces are not temporary benefits that can simply be traded away for other 
benefits, or transformed to fit very different values; rather, the openness 
one currently finds in the streets and parks of these spaces is a key, non-
negotiable element that cannot be sacrificed without undermining existing 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  To make such a sacrifice would not only 
103, at 121. 
 127. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). 
 128. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 261 (1993) (noting that whereas the 
“basic structure” of a society must be governed by liberal principles of justice, “for churches 
and universities different principles are plainly more suitable”—more specifically, those 
principles that arise from the “shared aims and purposes” of the organization). 
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hurt those city dwellers who live near parks.  It would also undercut the 
First Amendment interests of speakers (or listeners) from smaller 
communities who come to spread a message (or receive one), and the 
readers in all types of communities who will ultimately review and partake 
in the debates generated in such public spaces. 
It is still conceivable, perhaps, that courts would nonetheless find that 
cameras and effective face-recognition devices meet the legal threshold 
normally demanded of content-neutral measures in streets and parks:  
Courts might  conclude that carte blanche use of such powerful surveillance 
devices is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest,” namely its interest in battling crime and terrorism, and that 
it “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication,” 
because – in watching citizens – the cameras do not silence them.129
 There is also another more important reason that unrestrained 
video surveillance causes unacceptable damage to a public forum – 
even if watching citizens’ expressive activity does not technically 
count as regulating it under the First Amendment.   “Quintessential” 
public fora, such as streets and parks, are classified as such because 
there is something about their character that makes them natural 
places for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.  Even if the government’s 
surveillance measures do not technically run afoul of the court’s tests 
for content-based and content-neutral speech regulations in public 
fora, the government could easily undercut a key and long-standing 
element of First Amendment jurisprudence if were allowed to 
transform traditional  preserves of free and vigorous discussion into 
zones subject to constant and unrestrained official monitoring.  
  
But such a conclusion would be a questionable one.  At a minimum, 
the “narrow tailoring” requirement appears to require some showing 
that the design and institutional operation of the cameras will 
effectively limit them to the significant interests that justify their 
presence.  Additionally, it would be rash to conclude that a dragnet 
surveillance system leaves open “alternative channels” of 
communication simply because citizens may still hold private 
conversations under the close watch of the state.   Where anonymity 
is an important condition for protected speech, then an alternative 
channel is only viable alternative where it offers the anonymity that 
the cameras threaten to eliminate.  
Indeed, it is not simply the concrete features of public spaces, such as 
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streets and parks, which have a special status under the Constitution.  
Intangible environmental characteristics, such as possibilities for 
anonymity in public space and elsewhere, receive protection as well.  It is 
difficult to make sense of the Court’s current jurisprudence of anonymous 
speech unless one understands it as intended not only to protect against an 
author’s unwilling disclosure of identity, but also to protect the possibility 
of anonymous speech and information-seeking more generally.  In other 
words, like the electronic and physical sanctuaries that liberal societies 
have set aside to support robust debate and exchange of ideas, the 
opportunity for anonymity represents a kind of environmental condition—
one which is a precondition for significant First Amendment activities.  
Just as the “vast platform” provided by the Web and the natural assembly 
point presented by streets and parks dramatically lower the costs of 
effective free expression for ordinary citizens, the opportunity for 
anonymity also reduces the cost of such speech by placing it within the 
reach of many who would not otherwise risk the opprobrium and social 
penalty they might face if they challenged, or rethought, conventional 
views in public.  As Judith Shklar has written, the liberty to speak out and 
dissent against the powers that be, both political and social, must be 
available not only to “saints” and “heroes” but also to ordinary citizens, 
with ordinary amounts of courage.130
At first glance, this argument may seem to restate First Amendment 
jurisprudence on anonymity somewhat awkwardly and inaccurately.  It 
does not, for example, distinguish between compelled disclosure, which is 
the key target of McIntyre and other anonymous speech cases, and other 
government measures that make recognition of a person more likely.  
Indeed, one might claim that the argument presented here runs directly 
counter to another recent case; namely, the Second Circuit’s 2004 decision 
that the First Amendment does not rule out “anti-mask” laws.  In Church of 
American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, the Second Circuit upheld 
New York’s anti-mask law and rejected the Ku Klux Klan’s claim that the 
right of anonymous speech protected in McIntyre allowed Klan members to 
hold a public demonstration while wearing masks.
  Anonymity helps put dissent and free 
expression within their reach. 
131  McIntyre, said the 
Court, was about compelled disclosure.132
 
 130. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 6 (1986). 
  “The Supreme Court,” it 
stressed, “has never held that freedom of association or the right to engage 
in anonymous speech entails a right to conceal one’s appearance in a public 
 131. See 356 F.3d 197, 211 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 132. Id. at 208-09. 
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demonstration.”133  The Court then considered, and swiftly rejected, the 
view that the chilling effect of such an anti-mask law raised First 
Amendment problems.  The First Amendment “does not guarantee ideal 
conditions for [expressing viewpoints], since the individual’s right to 
speech must always be balanced against the state’s interest in safety.”134
This holding, one might argue, undercuts the claim that the First 
Amendment broadly protects the possibility of anonymity.  Rather than 
promote an “ideal environment” in which dissenters or protesters could feel 
comfortable, the Court’s anonymity cases serve the more limited goal of 
protecting against one particular type of damage to anonymity: namely, 
compelled disclosure by an individual writer of his identity or by a group of 
its membership.  Thus, the argument goes, the anti-disclosure case law 
cannot be invoked against technologies like face recognition, that 
“unmask” people from a far, rather than forcing them to reveal themselves 
through compelled speech..  Admittedly, there are a number of reasons that 
the First Amendment would conceivably restrict compelled disclosure, but 
provide no protection against other measures that undermine anonymity.  
One possibility is that the harm that such anonymous speech cases guard 
against is only harm that results from unwanted publicity. That kind of 
harm, after all, can result from either compelled disclosure (that was barred 
in McIntyre) or the compelled revelation of one’s face to on-lookers (that 
was allowed in Kerik). Rather, cases such as McIntyre might be understood 
as guarding against another harm as well; namely, the violation of 
autonomy that arises when someone is forced to voice or write words at 
odds with her wishes.  This, says Lee Tien, is what happens when an 
anonymous author is forced to state his name.
 
135
But this view of the Court’s anonymous speech jurisprudence depends 
heavily on McIntyre’s claim that anonymity is necessarily a part of a 
work’s content, and that by removing this anonymity and forcing the author 
to replace it with a name, one is forcibly changing the content of his 
speech, and thereby putting words in his mouth.  This claim, however, is an 
odd one.  In some circumstances, anonymous authorship does seem to be a 
part and parcel of the work’s message.  In some works of art, for example, 
an artist intentionally leaves a certain amount of mystery about his identity 
  In such a circumstance, 
his right “not to speak” is violated in a way that it is not violated when a 
speaker is simply made easier to identify instantaneously—for example, by 
forbidding the wearing of masks or by lining city streets with face 
recognition-equipped cameras. 
 
 133. Id. at 209. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Tien, supra note 103, at 133. 
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because of what such mystery adds to the content of the work.  In some 
cases, he uses a pseudonym chosen to illuminate the content of the work.  
In other cases, however, one’s name is no more integral a part of the work 
itself than a fax cover sheet is a part of the message it carries. 
Even in such circumstances, the absence or presence of a particular 
name can affect how the accompanying speech is perceived.  But in this 
respect, anonymity is no different from many aspects of a work that are 
normally considered part of its manner of presentation and not its content.  
For example, the loud volume of a speech or the kind of paper a book is 
printed on may well be chosen by an author or distributor in order to effect 
how the content is perceived.  As Lee Bollinger points out, so-called 
“manner” regulations are difficult to distinguish from “content” regulations 
as they may well “impinge on more than the circumstances under which the 
speech activity can occur.”136  More problematic for the view that 
anonymity is content is that almost any “circumstances under which the 
speech activity [occurs]” can conceivably be said to be a part of its 
content.137
There is, moreover, another more serious problem for the claim that 
anonymity protection should focus only on the harms of compelled 
disclosure: such protections could rather easily be circumvented by having 
someone else do the disclosing, thus obviating the need to force this 
information from an unwilling speaker. Consider, for example, the 
circumstances in Watchtower Bible v. Stratton.
  A speaker may well claim, for example, that his political 
speech has a different meaning in front of the White House than it does on 
a random street corner. 
138  The Village of Stratton’s 
ordinance demanded that individuals fill out a form identifying 
themselves.139
 
 136. BOLLINGER, supra note 
  But the police could also have had them appear for a photo, 
which might then have been matched against a driver’s license database.  
Their only obligation would then be to appear and stand still for the 
cameras, not to say or write anything.  Face recognition, of course, could 
make the same process much simpler and even less cumbersome for the 
solicitors in that case.  They would not even need to appear before town 
authorities.  All they would need to do would be to walk down the street 
while automatic devices do the disclosing, perhaps without the speaker 
even noticing.  This would solve the compelled disclosure problem.  But it 
wouldn’t solve the anonymous speech problem that caused the Court to 
strike down the Ohio law in Stratton, which was not about forced speech, 
56, at 202-03. 
 137. Id. 
 138. 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
 139. Id. 
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but about unwanted identification in circumstances where solicitors might 
want to, and are normally able to remain anonymous. 
Likewise, it is not compelled disclosure that is the central harm in the 
anonymous association cases.  In cases such as NAACP v. Alabama,140 or 
Bates v. Little Rock,141
How then might one make sense of the Kerik decision against the 
Court’s anonymous speech jurisprudence, and what implication does this 
decision have for the development of powerful identification technologies 
intended for installment in city streets?  The best account of Kerik is that, 
while the First Amendment does give people a right to remain unidentified 
in many circumstances, it does not give them a right to become 
unidentifiable and untraceable.
 the Court’s concern was not that a group’s 
leadership was forced to engage in an involuntary speech act, but rather 
that the members of the group might be subject to harm as a consequence 
of losing their anonymity.  The compelled disclosure forbidden in these 
decisions could be avoided by enabling the state to spy on certain groups 
and record the names of their members.  For example, a state-operated 
surveillance camera might zoom in on and capture images of a membership 
list in the event that a group leaves it open to public observation.  Or 
perhaps biometric cameras could identify and create records of who 
attended the group’s meetings.  Again, while avoiding compelled 
disclosure, such state actions would squarely conflict with the purpose of 
the associational anonymity decisions—to assure that associational activity 
could remain shielded from retaliation by those opposed to it. 
142
This distinction between anonymity and untraceability parallels the 
distinction that exists  in the wiretapping context between the right to avoid 
being wire-tapped (without probable cause) and the right to make one’s 
telephone facilities “wire-tap proof.”  While the former right against wire 
tapping is now an established part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as 
well as statutory law, the latter right has no such constitutional status and 
has been clearly repudiated by Congress in the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), which requires telephone 
service providers to make electronic surveillance possible over their 
facilities so that such facilities cannot be used by criminals or terrorists to 
 
 
 140. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). 
 141. 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960). 
 142. For illuminating and more detailed discussions of the contrast between “traceable” 
and “untraceable” anonymity (especially as that distinction applies to the law of cyberspace) 
see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enemies, 1995 J. ONLINE L, art. 4 
(1995) and David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, 
Psuedonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1996). 
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escape monitoring by law enforcement.143
The reliance on a distinction between anonymity and untraceability is 
not without problems.  As I have argued elsewhere,
 
144 even where a 
government entity or private actor simply increases its capacity to monitor 
individuals’ privacy—for example, by installing, but not activating bugging 
devices or secret cameras—it can cause many of the harms that actual 
monitoring causes even if the observer does not engage in any spying.  A 
person’s concern that he has become much more vulnerable to monitoring 
can be just as constraining as actually being monitored; if he is unsure 
whether the video camera is operating or not, he may have to assume that 
anything he does may be captured on tape.  Indeed, even if he remains 
unaware that the installation of a camera or bug has compromised his 
privacy, this compromise still does harm by breaching a barrier that 
protects individuals from monitoring at the whim of the state.  Thus, one 
court squarely rejected a defendant’s argument, in a privacy tort case, that 
he never intruded upon the plaintiff couple’s privacy because there was no 
showing that he actually used the listening and recording device he had 
installed in their bedroom.145  One might similarly question the Supreme 
Court’s assumption—in United States v. Karo146—that no Fourth 
Amendment violation could have occurred where an installed beeper has 
not yet been activated.147
This analysis has implications for how one thinks about the use of 
biometric technology: laws which require everyone to enter face prints, 
fingerprints, or DNA samples for future identification are not necessarily 
saved from Fourth Amendment challenge by the fact that police have not 
yet used biometric technologies to specifically identify them.  Unlike a law 
that simply requires that masks be removed, such a biometric data 
collection scheme would make it potentially simple for authorities to 
breach anonymity with little effort, and make individuals far less secure in 
the belief that what they do anonymously today will not be linked to them 
tomorrow.  On the other hand, one can envision face recognition 
  And one might likewise question the suggestion 
I made above, that laws which require people to remain identifiable do not 
necessarily cause the same harm as laws that require them to identify 
themselves. 
 
 143. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279. 
 144. Blitz, supra note 32, at 1447-48. 
 145.   See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1965) (finding that publicity 
with respect to private matters is an injury to personality “[w]hether [it is] actual or 
potential”). 
 146. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 147. Id. at 706. 
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technologies—supplemented with scrambling devices—which allow police 
to collect basic information about what people are doing without 
immediately learning of their identities.  Then, if police have a need to 
“unscramble” and identify someone in a section of footage, technology 
might allow them to do so (subject to a showing of necessity), thus making 
individuals traceable although not immediately identifiable by law 
enforcement.  Researchers trying to reconcile privacy and face recognition 
have begun developing precisely this kind of technology.148
This rethinking of Kerik’s anti-mask decision, and its relationship to the 
Supreme Court’s anonymous speech thus aids us in understanding why 
municipal governments may not have carte blanche, under the First 
Amendment, to line streets with face recognition devices.  More 
significantly, the above discussion of First Amendment law and free speech 
on the Web  provides one powerful answer, suggested by First Amendment 
precedent, to the question with which this article began; namely, does the 
Constitution in any sense favor urban landscapes that allow for greater 
freedom and individuality, or do defenders of such individuals simply have 
to make their peace with the notion that the openness and anonymity of 
twentieth-century cities was just a historical phase rather than a 
constitutional right?  The first part of the answer is that the openness and 
anonymity of twentieth-century cities is both a historical phase and a 
constitutional right.  It is a historical development, but one that the Court 
now recognizes as supporting First Amendment freedoms (just as it 
recognizes the Web as playing a similar role).  Such a claim may appear to 
be at odds both with those approaches to constitutional interpretation that 
rely on original (pre-twentieth century) understandings of constitutional 
liberties, as well as those that provide courts with freedom to adopt new 
conceptions of such liberties, narrower than those of an earlier, less 
security-conscious age.  But as Randy Barnett points out, “with any theory 
of textual interpretation, not just originalism, there is a need to establish the 
appropriate degree of abstraction or generality which properly attaches to 
  Of course, 
there are still difficult questions one would have to address about whether 
making people’s identities traceable in this way leaves their anonymity too 
vulnerable.  This is not an easy question, and would probably require 
developing some “bright line” tests that do not correspond perfectly with 
every case-specific intuition.  In any event, such an approach would, at the 
very least, identify two poles that are unacceptable given First Amendment 
and security interests; namely, instantaneous biometric identification, on 
the one hand, and complete untraceability on the other. 
 
 148. See Blitz, supra note 32, at 1475-76 & n. 559. 
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particular provisions.”149  The original meaning of particular language, 
such as “freedom of speech,” may be “underdeterminate,” leaving room for 
“constitutional construction within the bounds established by original 
meaning,”150 and perhaps for manifestations of expressive liberty that 
eighteenth-century citizens could not have anticipated.  Moreover, even if 
one places “bounds” on constitutional interpretation from some source 
other than original meaning—for example, from subsequent constitutional 
transformations outside of the formal amendment process151
The above discussion of First Amendment law also suggests an answer 
to the question of how we can reconcile liberal neutrality with a 
constitutional approach that gives preference to a specific (e.g., urban) ideal 
of the good life.  The Constitution does in some sense favor urban 
landscapes that allow for greater freedom and individuality, but this is not 
because our constitutional regime prefers such environments over others, 
but because it demands a larger social environment that at least includes 
such environments as important (and widely-accessible) components.  Such 
a limit on municipal redesign follows from courts’ demands that key public 
spaces in urban life,
—such bounds 
could prevent electoral or legislative majorities from sharply curtailing the 
openness and anonymity modern Americans can find in public fora (at least 
in the absence of additional “higher lawmaking”).  Thus, my argument here 
is not for or against any particular approach to constitutional interpretation, 
but rather for the notion that if key, long-established features of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence are to be preserved, any such interpretation must 
leave some room for the incomparable freedom that Simmel found in the 
modern metropolis. 
152
 
 149. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 644 
(1999).  See also LAURENCE H., TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITION 
73-80 (1991) (arguing that those charged with applying constitutional rights must confront 
the question of “what level of generality to use” in interpreting those rights). 
 including streets, parks, and plazas, retain a 
character that favors robust debate and individual expression—and from 
their demand that the anonymity one finds among strangers continues to be 
available to speakers and listeners alike.   
 150. Id. at 645. 
 151. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE I: FOUNDATIONS 41-44, 50-57, 266-94 
(1991) (arguing that Americans can act, and have acted, as a constitution-making majority 
outside of the formal amendment process). 
   152. This First Amendment protection in streets, parks, and other traditional public 
forums also applies outside of cities, in small, less anonymous communities.  But although it 
is meant for all environments – and not just cities – public forum doctrine necessarily 
safeguards the greater sense of freedom from monitoring and constraint one often finds in 
an urban public spaces.  See supra, at 110. 
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Of course, in some respects the suitability of streets and parks for these 
purposes is a question of architectural design and planning rather than of 
First Amendment law.  Thus, some of the harshest criticism that Jane 
Jacobs directs at modern city planning accuses it of deadening public fora 
such as sidewalks and parks.153  Sidewalks, for example, become 
inappropriate for vibrant and heterogeneous city life when one “cleanses” 
them of stores and other appropriate sites for people to engage in casual 
conversation.  Where sidewalk life is marked by trees, flowers, and 
attractive paving, but lacks places for casual contact, social gatherings are 
forced from public sites, like stores, into private places, like individuals’ 
houses, and thus into a setting where contact and conversation is less 
temporary and less consistent with privacy.154  In such circumstances, a 
“suburbanlike sharing of private lives grow[s]” in place of “city sidewalk 
life.”155
 Similarly, Jacobs draws on issues of park placement and design, and not 
public forum law, when she argues that modern city planners often design 
parks that will predictably become blighted and frightening places for 
many citizens to explore or congregate.
  But while such planning questions implicate zoning law, they do 
not make sidewalk design a matter of First Amendment law.   
156  The solution is not to enlist 
courts and constitutional provisions to force cities into designing parks 
correctly, but rather to drive home the point that parks must be placed near 
natural “focal points” for city dwellers, near places where “life swirls— 
where there is work, cultural, residential and commercial activity,” and not 
places where people have little reason to be or visit in their everyday 
lives.157
One might well describe the installation of cameras and biometric 
identification devices in similar terms: while such changes have significant 
implications for urban anonymity, one might argue that they are design 
changes rather than censorship laws.  And if they deaden life in streets, 
parks, and other plazas, writers in the mold of Jane Jacobs and William H. 
Whyte can tell citizens (and legislators) why this is the case instead of 
looking for courts to provide a solution.  But I believe this analogy stems 
from a misconception.  In the first place, the city planning choices that 
Jacobs and White scorn are not intended to deaden public space and silence 
its inhabitants.  The sterility of public life that follows such design is in 
 
 
 153. See generally JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 
39. 
 154. Id. at 63. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 97. 
 157. Id. at 101. 
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many cases an unintended consequence.  By contrast, emerging 
surveillance systems are often intended to roll back some of the openness 
and anonymity that make freedom from government control possible in 
public spaces (and unfortunately help shield criminals as well as others 
from ongoing state monitoring).  Moreover, a design change is not only a 
design change if it is clearly the functional equivalent of a law that wrests 
away citizens’ anonymity.  The latter is a more profound threat to citizens’ 
use of public space, especially since it tends to arise not from discrete 
design choices in certain parks or neighborhoods that might be 
counterbalanced with better decisions elsewhere, but rather from a 
comprehensive municipal policy to intensify the surveillance of a city’s 
public spaces.  Consider, for example, the video surveillance system now 
being planned for Chicago.  This policy does not involve case-by-case 
addition of cameras to a particular park or street corner, but rather 
placement of numerous cameras throughout public space that will “make 
[Chicago residents] some of the most closely observed in the world.”158  
And this public video surveillance measure will be supplemented with a 
“Homeland Security” fiber optic grid that is “1,000 miles long with 
cameras and biochemical sensors to watch for signs of terrorism, crime and 
traffic tie-ups.”159
This does not mean that courts should invoke First Amendment 
anonymity protections to order removal of all such surveillance systems.  
On the contrary, as I have argued in the Fourth Amendment context, such 
technological advances in surveillance can offer great benefits to city-
dwellers and others who feel in need of greater protection against terrorism 
and other violent crime.  They may even play an admirable role (albeit a 
partial one) in remedying some of the blight and fear that, as Jacobs 
laments, has driven vibrant pedestrian life away from sidewalks and 
neighborhood parks, particularly in poorer areas.  Indeed, Jacobs herself 
notes that one of the keys to keeping sidewalks safe, and thus attractive for 
pedestrians, is to assure that “public street spaces have eyes on them as 
continuously as possible.”
  One would misunderstand the proposed Chicago 
surveillance system by describing it merely as an inept design of public 
urban space.  It is a well thought-out plan to closely monitor space that has 
traditionally served as a key preserve of First Amendment activity. 
160
 
 158. Steven Kinzer, Chicago Moving to “Smart” Surveillance Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2004, at A18. 
  Jacobs was talking about the natural 
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surveillance that comes with having numerous other pedestrians in the area, 
but public cameras and biometric identification devices can provide more 
continuous watch, better ability to identify and apprehend criminals, and 
more immediate contact with police officials who might intervene in 
criminal activity before harm is done (indeed, many cameras feed directly 
into police monitoring stations).  The supplementation of natural with 
artificial surveillance, however, should not come at the expense of the other 
crucial benefits provided by the life of sidewalks and parks.  In the first 
place, such surveillance must not be designed in such a way that deprives 
people of the privacy they generally find so crucial in city life.  The 
presence of other pedestrians does not do this: for the reasons Jacobs 
explains, even sharing the sidewalk with dense crowds of people does not 
entail sharing all of your life.  On the contrary, while such temporary 
contact is enriching and enjoyable, and helps everyone on sidewalks feel 
more secure that they will have nearby support in times of danger, it does 
not give people a large window into one another’s lives.  If the new and 
powerful forms of artificial surveillance destroy such public privacy, and 
drive neighbors and acquaintances toward the more complete revelation 
that is characteristic of smaller, more closely monitored communities, then 
they will alter the character of public urban spaces. 
The solution, as I have argued in the Fourth Amendment context, is not 
to bar local governments from making use of cameras and identification 
technologies, but rather to ensure that they are designed to coexist with, 
rather than displace, the anonymity and freedom that has long been an 
invaluable feature of such spaces.  To this end, courts, legislators, and 
others charged with upholding constitutional values can require that public 
cameras, wherever possible, include design features or operate under 
institutional rules that limit damage to individuals’ anonymity as far as 
possible.161  They might insist, for example, on technologies that 
“scramble” faces in video images, unmasking them only when necessary 
for a criminal or terrorism investigation, or for other tasks crucial for 
protecting public safety.162
It is still likely that changes in city life will one day force city-dwellers 
  They might also insist that even scrambled 
video recordings can only be watched by those law enforcement officials 
with a need to see them.  Far from paving the way for everyone to monitor 
everyone else, then, such technologies might transform criminal and 
terrorist investigations without displacing the freedom from monitoring 
made possible by modern urban environments. 
 
to terrorism and other violent crime than are communities with lower population density). 
 161. Blitz, supra note 32, at 1456-1478. 
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to experience something akin to the environmental shock experienced by 
the “The Prisoner” when he opened his apartment window to find an 
unfamiliar world outside.163
 
  It is likely, for example, that the streets, parks, 
and buildings of the future will look strikingly different than they do today.  
But that does not mean that the constitutional values of that world should 
be as unfamiliar to modern-day writers as its physical appearance.  For the 
reasons I have described in this article, even if parks, streets, and other 
spaces in the urban environment come to have a very different feel and 
appearance, existing principles of First Amendment jurisprudence require 
that they continue to serve their long-standing function of providing 
individuals with spaces that are well-suited to host a free and unconstrained 
marketplace of ideas. 
 
 163. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. 
